The Historical sources of the Aporetic Think
A Sceptic, in the original sense of the Greek term,
is simply an «inquirer» or investigator. But inquiry often
leads to an impasse, and end in increduly or despair of a
solution, so that the inquirer becomes a dobter or a disbeliver,
and Scepticism receives its usual connotation. All down the history of Greek philosophy we have found
traces of sceptical thought in the repeated discrediting of sense-perception and the frequent insistence on the folly
of vulgar opinion. But, with the exception of Sophists like Protagoras and Gorgias, all the philosophers agreed in
asuming that truth existed and that knowledge of it was possible. When Scepticism was revived and reorganized
under the name of «Pyrrhonism» its main task was to challenge this assumption and to mantain, if not the impossibility
of knowledge, at least the impossibility of positively affirming its possibility. Its watchword was «Suspend judgement»
(Assentionis retentio). The history of Scepticism, as a definite tradition or School, may conveniently be divided
into four periods or stages:
1) Practical Scepticism of Pyrrho of Elis (360 ~ 275 B.C.), and his pupil Timon
of Phlius (315 ~ 225 B.C.)
2) Critical Scepticism and probabilism of the New Academy, Arcesilas of Pitane (315 ~ 241 B.C.) and Carneades
of Cyrene (213 ~ 129 B.C.). This ended in the Eclecticism of Philo and Antiochus (ob. 69 B.C.)
3)Pyrrhonism
revived, systematized and developed dialectically by Aenesidemus of Cnossus (100 ~ 40 B.C.) and Agrippa (first century A.D.)
4) Final development of Empiric Scepticism, culminating in Sextus Empiricus (160 ~ 210 A.D.).
We start here a brief account of each of these stages: Pyrrho of Elis, in spite of some later
traditions about him, was probably not at all a full blown Sceptic, but rather a moralist of an austere
and ascetic type, as Cicero represents him (Acad.Pr.ii.130, De Fin. iv. 43, 49), who cultivated
insensibility to externals and superiority to environment. Probably he derived from Democritus a deep
distrust of the value of sense-perception, but otherwise he seems to have ben imbued with dogmatism, though
it was the dogmatism of the will rather than of the intellect.
We may fairly assume that the causes which led to the Scepticism of Pyrrho and his immediate followers were
twofold, firstly, the intellectual confusion which resulted from the number of conflicting doctrines and rival
Schools, and secondly, the political confusion and social chaos which spread through the Hellenic
world after Alexander's death, together with the new
insight into strange habits and customs which was
given by the opening up of the East. The natural
result of the situation at the close of the fourth
century was to shake men's belief in tradition and
custom, to dissolve the old creeds and loyalties, and
to produce the demand for a new way of salvation in
the midst of a crumbling world. Pyrrho, it would
seem, shared this attitude, and stood out as the
apostle of disillusionment. He would not seek or
promise «happiness», in the usual sense of the word,
but he sought and taught the negative satisfaction of
freedom from care and worry by the cultivation of a
neutrsl, non-committal attitude towards all the problems of life and thought. In self-defence he sought
refuge within himself, there to achieve a seif-centred
«apathy» which his disciples were to acclaim, under
the name of «ataraxy»,as the Chief End of Man.
Probably, then, the main, if not the only, interest
of Pyrrho was in the ethical and practical side of
Scepticism as the speediest cure for the ills oflife.
Timon of Phlius spent the latter part of his long
life at Athens. In his earlier days he is said to have
sat under Stilpo at Megara, as well as under Pyrrho at
Elis. His admiration for the latter was unbounded,
although it would seem that he did not copy his ascetic
habits too closely. He was a voluminous writer of
both prose and poetry-epics, tragedies, satires-but
only a few fragments of two of his works have survived,
as the «Images» or «Illusions» (Hindalmoi), and
the «Silli» or «Lampoons» (Silloi). The latter
emdently became very popular because of its mordant
wit. It consisted of three books, all deriding the professors of philosophy, and written in hexameters
in the Homeric style, beginning thus: «Come now, listen to me, the polypragmatical Sophists.
The second and third books were in the form of a
dialogue between Timon and Xenophanes, in which
the latter expresses his contempt for nearly all the
rival schools of thought. It appears, then, that the
only philosophers for whom Timon entertained any
respect were the Eleatics, Democritus and Protagoras, the most severe critics of knowledge in the form of
sense-perception. This exposure of the futility of
philosophizing served to support the indifferentist
attitude of Pyrrho; and Timon by his writings (for
Pyrrho wrote nothing) popularized the Sceptical view
that the way to make the best of life is to eschew
dogma and to cultivate'mental repose. It is probably
a mistake of Sextus (Adv. Math. iii. 2, vi. 66) to ascribe
to Timon formal argumentation concerning «hypotheses» and the «divisibility of time», considering
his ridicule of dialectic and his avoidance of «the
strife of tongues»; and it is very doubtful whether
he (or Pyrrho) invented or used any of the technical
vocabulary of Scepticism (i.e. «Suspension» «No more» «Equipollence») which is commonly ascribed to him or his master.
Scepticism in the New Academy (cf. Pyrr. Hyp.
i. 220 ff.).
With Arcesilas Scepticism entered upon a
new stage of development. It ceased to be purely
practical, and became mainly theoretical. Arcesilas
succeeded Crates as Hesd of the Academy about
270 B.C. He appears to have been influenced by the
Megarics as well as by Pyrrho, and was eminent as
a dialectician and controversialist. His delight was to argue in utramque partem and balance argument against argument; and he took up the position that to know we know is an impossibility, and to seek for absolute truth an absurdity. His polemic was
chiefly directed against the Stoic Epistemology and its
doctrine of the «apprehensive presentation» as the
«Criterion». He maintained that we can «assent»
to no sense-impression as carrying conviction and indubitably true, and that the objective realities are
consequently incognizable, and we can only «suspend
judgrement» about them, unless we content ourselves
with fallible «opinion» instead of scientific «knowledge».
But the Stoic «Sage» never «opines» neither can he «know»; therefore he must suspend
judgement and turn Sceptic. False and true presentations
are indistinguishable: no valid criterion exists, we have no guide but opinion, and we can only think,
believe, and act in accordance with what seems reasonable (Heulogon) or probably right. Thus, while Pyrrho had renounced and Timon flouted the Dogmatics,
Arcesilas started the practice of refuting them scientifically and systematically, and earned thereby the
abuse of Timon for his lapse from pure Pyrrhonism.
Carneanes of Cyrene, like Arcesilas and Pyrrho, left
no writings, but his views were preserved by his
disciple Cleitomachus (Hasdrubal). He was a brilliant
teacher, a formidable dialectician, and perhaps the
most talented philosopher of the post-Aristotelian
period. His energies were mainly devoted to negative
criticism of the theories of the Dogmatists, especially
the Stoics. He resumed and developed the arguments
with which Arcesilas had attacked the Stoic theory of
knowledge, and which Chrysippus had, in the meanwhile, attempted to rebut. Neither the senses nor
the reason, he argued, can supply any infallible «criterion»: there is no specific difference between false «presentation»
and true: besides any true presentation you can set a false one which is in no wise different.
The dreamer, the drunkard, the madman
have illusions of the truth of which they are convinced:
you see two eggs or two hairs and cannot tell the
one from the other: you cannot distinguish the true
impression from the false, or assert that the one rather
than the other is produced by a real object. It is in
vain, then, to look to the senses for certainty; and it
is equally vain to look to the reason since it (as the
Stoics held) is wholly dependent on the senses and
based on experience. Logic, the product of the
reasoning faculty, is discredited because of the number
of insoluble fallacies for which it is responsible, such
as «The Liar» ("The Cretan says 'I lic': is he a liar ?"),
«The Cornutus» ("Have you shed your
horns, yes or no ?"), «The Sorites» or Chain-argument ("How many grains make a heap ? Take
10, 20, 30, etc.; away, is it still a heap ?"). Chrysippus
when confronted with the Sorites in a dialectical discussion is said to have called a halt and refused to
answer, thus giving in to the Sceptic by «suspending
judgement». Reason is thus found to be as fallible
as sensation, and certitude impossible.
Carneades also attacked the Ethical system of the
Stoics, exposing their inconsistency in saying that
Virtue is directed to choosing the prime objects of
natural desire while denying to these objects the
name of «good». He criticized also their Theology,
their doctrines of the Divine Nature, of Providence,
of Divination and Prophecy. The Stoics were fond
of appealing to the consensus gentium, or the universal
belief in the existence of the gods: Carneades
ridiculed that appeal. For how do we know that the
belief is universal ? And why appeal to the multitude
who, the Stoics tell us, are all fools ? Why call in
ignorance as judge ? And as to divination and prognostication,
they rest on no principles of science but
are mere quackery and tricks of the trade. The God
of the Stoics is an incredible Being because he is
composed of contradictory attributes. If He is to be
infinite, omniscient, all-grood, and imperishable, He
cannot be either composite or corporeal or animate
or rational or virtuous, all such qualities belonging
to objects which lie in the sphere of becoming and
perishing. In support of their theory of Providence
the Stoics brought forward evidences of design in
Nature. Carneades retorted by quoting cases of
snake-bites and wrecks at sea. Reason, said the Stoics,
is a gift of Providence to man: why then, replied
Carneades, did not Providence see to it that the
majority were endowed with a «right reason»
instead of one that only enables them to outdo the
brutes in brutishness? Only a few possess right
reason; so thc Stoic God must be miserly in his gifts !
In all this the position of Carneades is purely
agnostic. He does not wish to affirm a negative,
but merely to show up the untenability of the Stoic
dogmas, and to reassert as regards all departments
of knowledge tho impossibility of attaining absolute
certitude. When the pretentious structure of the
Stoics had been thus riddled by the arrows of Carneades,
their Ideal Sage must have appeared but as a figment to many, and their anthropomorphic Deity
as an incredible bundle of contradictions.But there was a constructive as well as a destructive
side to the teaching of Carneades. He took over,
modified, and developed the theory of Arcesilas that,
despite the impossibility of objective knowledge, a
sufficient ground for practical choice and action might
be found in the «reasonable» (Heulogon) or subjectively
satisfying. He granted to the Stoics that some sense-impressions or opinions seem to the percipient superior
to others, and this apparent superiority provided a
sufficient reason for preference and consequential
action. Impressions being thus subjectively distinguishable, judgements may be graded in value as
more or less «persuasive» or «probable» (Pithavoi).
Carneades then classified presentations in this way:
(1) the apparently false; (2) the apparently true,
which are of three grades: (a) the probable in itself,
(b) the probable and «uncontradicted» [i.e. by
accompanpingr conditions (Aperìspastos)], (c) the
probable and uncontradicted and «closely scrutinized»
or «tested» (Diexodeuméne). These apparently true
impressions produce varying degrees of «conviction»
and deserve proportionate «assent» (Sunkatàthesis)
of a relative kind, the only kind of assent possible
for the Sceptic who denies that objective certitude
is attainable. In connexion with this doctrine of
«probabilism» Carneades defended human freedom,
in «assent», choice and action, as against the determinism of the Stoics with their rigid theory of Destiny
and Necessity; and he subjected their doctrine on
this subject to a searching criticism which exposed its
inherent inconsistency. With Carneades the dialectical Scepticism of the
New Academy came to an end. His successors, Philo
of Larissa (ob. 80 B.C.) and Antiochus of Ascalon(ob. 69 B.C.), surrendered his theory of nescience, and
reverted to a more dogmatic position. Both were
Eclectics, Antiochus so much so that he asserted the
harmony, if not the practical identity, of the doctrines
of the Academy with those of the Peripatetics and
Stoics, and his teaching was a curious amalgam of
them all. This tendency to doctrinal conflation continued to characterize the philosophers of the
succeeding generations till the rise of Neoplatonism, excepting only those attached to the Epicurean School and
the Later Sceptics. The first of the «Later Sceptics» who revive the
the original «Pyrrhonism», was AENESIDEMUS, a
younger contemporary of Antiochus. Cnossus in
Crete may have been his birthplace, Alexandria was
where he taught. Though originally an Academic,
he denounced Arcesilas and Carneades as dogmatists
in disguise rather than true Sceptics, since we cannot:
know that knowledge is impossible. His treatise
Pyrrhonean Discourses consisted of eight books
in which he explained his dissent from the New
Academy, and criticized in detail the logic, ethics, and
physics of Stoicism. In another work, Introductory
Outline of Pyrrhonism, he set forth his famous
«Ten Tropes» or «Modes» of procedure, for the
refuting of Dogmatism in all its forms. Apparently
the order in which they are drawn up was not fixed,
since Sextus's order differs from that of Diogenes
Laertius; nor does it seem to be governed by any
logical principle. The Tropes themselves merely
formulate arguments in favour of the relativity of
knowledge, borrowed from earlier Sceptical teachers, Sophists, Megarics, Academics; and, as Lotze says (Logic, III, i, 310)
«The Ten Tropes, or logical grounds of doubt, all
come to this, that sensations by themselves cannot
discover to us what is the nature of the object which
excites them».Besides these Ten Tropes, Aenesidemus (in his
Pyrrhonean Discourses, bk. 5) summarized the arguments against causality and current theories of
«cause» in his «Eight (Aetiological) Tropes».
These form a list of fallacious methods of reasoning about «cause». His objections rest
on the assumption that «cause» is a thing in
itself. and causality a real objective quality inherent
therein. Similarly he attacked the Stoic and Epicurean
doctrine of «Signs» (Semeia), or «effects» which
point back to «causes», arguing that no phenomenon
can safely be regarded as a «sign», because «doctors
differ» in interpreting symptoms. But, to judge of Sextus, Aenesidemus
was not consistent in his Scepticism. We are
told that he regarded the Sceptic system (Agoghé)
as a road leading to the Heracleitean philosophy, on
the ground that the (Sceptic) view that opposites
apparently belong to the same object is prefatory to
the (Heracleitean) view that they really so belong.
We are told also that he held that the primary world-principle is air,
which he identified with time and
number; and that he explained the origin of the
world in all its variety from this unitary substance
by supposing it to be receptive of opposite qualities,
and every whole self-identical in all its parts. He is
also said to have reduced the six kinds of motion
distinguished by Aristotle, and the ten of Plato, to
two: locomotion and alteration or transformation;
and a peculiar theory of Soul, or reason (Dianoia)
is ascribed to him, according to which the reason
exists outside the body and is somehow inspired
so that it can act from within through the senses.
With the theory of reason as external, and therefore
not individualized but «common» (Koiné), like the
«Logos» of Heracleitus, is connected the further
theory, ascribed to Aenesidemus, that some phenomena appear alike to all men
«in common», while others appear different to different percipients, and
that the former class are «true», the latter «false»,
universality of experience thus being the «Criterion» of truth.
How we are to reconcile this hybrid dogmatism
with the undoubted Pyrrhonism of Aenesidemus is
a puzzling question which has much exercised the
historians of philosophy. It has been suggested that
Sextus has misunderstood or misrepresented Aenesidemus;
or that Aenesidemus did ultimately pass
over from the Sceptical to the Dogmstic position; or
that his apparent Dogmatism can be explained away
as no real surrender of Scepticism but rather an unconscious
yielding to the Eclectic influences of his intellectual
environment. None of these suggestions seems
wholly satisfactory; but perhaps the least difficult
supposition is that Sextus is unintentionally misrepresenting Aenesidemus by a loose use of language
when he ascribes the dogmas mentioned above to
«Aenesidemus and his followers» (Oi perì ton Aivesìdemov).
If so, we may suppose that while Aenesidemus may have given a start to the dogmatizing
tendency by enlarging on the points of similarity
between Scepticism and Heracleiteanism and claiming
Heracleitus as a forerunner, certain of his adherents
pushed that tendency to excess and indulged in an Eclectic dogmatism, after the fashion of Antiochus,
which blended Scepticism with Heracleitean and Stoic doctrine.
Of the successors of Aenesidemus we know no more than the names until we come to Agrippa, about a century later.
Agrippa was followed by Zeuxippus, Zeuxis, and Antiochus. In the last stage of Greek Scepticism
we found Menodotus of Nicomediaand Theodas, Herodotus of Tarsus, then Sextus Empiricus
(200 A.D.)
...next continuing, coming soon...
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